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H. Bojinov, A. Casal and T. Hogg, Multiagent control of self-reconfigurable robots
We demonstrate how multiagent systems provide useful control techniques for modular self-
reconfigurable (metamorphic) robots. Such robots consist of many modules that can move relative to
each other, thereby changing the overall shape of the robot to suit different tasks. Multiagent control
is particularly well-suited for tasks involving uncertain and changing environments. We illustrate this
approach through simulation experiments of Proteo, a metamorphic robot system currently under
development.  2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.
H. Tonino, A. Bos, M. de Weerdt and C. Witteveen, Plan coordination by revision in
collective agent based systems
In order to model plan coordination behavior of agents we develop a simple framework for
representing plans, resources and goals of agents. Plans are represented as directed acyclic graphs of
skills and resources that, given adequate initial resources, can realize special resources, called goals.
Given the storage costs of resources, application costs of skills, and values of goals, it is possible
to reason about the profits of a plan for an agent. We then model two forms of plan coordination
behavior between two agents, viz. fusion, aiming at the maximization of the total yield of the agents
involved, and collaboration, which aims at the maximization of the individual yield of each agent.
We argue how both forms of cooperation can be seen as iterative plan revision processes. We also
present efficient polynomial algorithms for agent plan fusion and collaboration that are based on
this idea of iterative plan revision. Both the framework and the fusion algorithm will be illustrated
by an example from the field of transportation, where agents are transportation companies.  2002
Published by Elsevier Science B.V.
B.J. Grosz, S. Kraus, D.G. Sullivan and S. Das, The influence of social norms and
social consciousness on intention reconciliation
Research on resource-bounded agents has established that rational agents need to be able to revise
their commitments in light of new opportunities. In the context of collaborative activities, rational
agents must be able to reconcile their intentions to do team-related actions with other, conflicting
intentions. The SPIRE experimental system allows the process of intention reconciliation in team
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contexts to be simulated and studied. Initial work with SPIRE examined the impact of environmental
factors and agent utility functions on individual and group outcomes in the context of one set of
social norms governing collaboration. This paper extends those results by further studying the effect
of environmental factors and the agents’ level of social consciousness and by comparing the impact of
two different types of social norms on agent behavior and outcomes. The results show that the choice
of social norms influences the accuracy of the agents’ responses to varying environmental factors,
as well as the effectiveness of social consciousness and other aspects of agents’ utility functions.
In experiments using heterogeneous groups of agents, both sets of norms were susceptible to the
free-rider effect. However, the gains of the less responsible agents were minimal, suggesting that
agent designers would have little incentive to design agents that deviate from the standard level of
responsibility to the group.  2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.
S. Sen, Believing others: Pros and cons
In open environments there is no central control over agent behaviors. On the contrary, agents in such
systems can be assumed to be primarily driven by self interests. Under the assumption that agents
remain in the system for significant time periods, or that the agent composition changes only slowly,
we have previously presented a prescriptive strategy for promoting and sustaining cooperation among
self-interested agents. The adaptive, probabilistic policy we have prescribed promotes reciprocative
cooperation that improves both individual and group performance in the long run. In the short
run, however, selfish agents could still exploit reciprocative agents. In this paper, we evaluate the
hypothesis that the exploitative tendencies of selfish agents can be effectively curbed if reciprocative
agents share their “opinions” of other agents. Since the true nature of agents is not known a priori
and is learned from experience, believing others can also pose its own hazards. We provide a learned
trust-based evaluation function that is shown to resist both individual and concerted deception on the
part of selfish agents in a package delivery domain.  2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.
P. Faratin, C. Sierra and N.R. Jennings, Using similarity criteria to make issue trade-
offs in automated negotiations
Automated negotiation is a key form of interaction in systems that are composed of multiple
autonomous agents. The aim of such interactions is to reach agreements through an iterative process
of making offers. The content of such proposals are, however, a function of the strategy of the agents.
Here we present a strategy called the trade-off strategy where multiple negotiation decision variables
are traded-off against one another (e.g., paying a higher price in order to obtain an earlier delivery
date or waiting longer in order to obtain a higher quality service). Such a strategy is commonly
known to increase the social welfare of agents. Yet, to date, most computational work in this area has
ignored the issue of trade-offs, instead aiming to increase social welfare through mechanism design.
The aim of this paper is to develop a heuristic computational model of the trade-off strategy and show
that it can lead to an increased social welfare of the system. A novel linear algorithm is presented that
enables software agents to make trade-offs for multi-dimensional goods for the problem of distributed
resource allocation. Our algorithm is motivated by a number of real-world negotiation applications
that we have developed and can operate in the presence of varying degrees of uncertainty. Moreover,
we show that on average the total time used by the algorithm is linearly proportional to the number
of negotiation issues under consideration. This formal analysis is complemented by an empirical
evaluation that highlights the operational effectiveness of the algorithm in a range of negotiation
scenarios. The algorithm itself operates by using the notion of fuzzy similarity to approximate the
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preference structure of the other negotiator and then uses a hill-climbing technique to explore the
space of possible trade-offs for the one that is most likely to be acceptable.  2002 Published by
Elsevier Science B.V.
S. Matsubara and M. Yokoo, Defection-free exchange mechanisms based on an entry
fee imposition
We propose a safe exchange mechanism involving indivisible goods and divisible goods. A typical
situation is an exchange involving goods and money in a person-to-person trade in an Internet
auction. Although the Internet and agent technologies have facilitated world-wide trade, we
sometimes encounter risky situations, such as fraud, in the process of exchanges involving goods
and money. This problem is becoming more serious with the growing popularity of person-to-person
trade. One of the reasons why fraud is becoming widespread is that obtaining a new identifier in
a network is cheap. This makes it almost impossible to exclude malicious agents from trade. One
solution is to impose an entry fee. However, if the entry fee is too high, it will discourage newcomers
from starting deals. To resolve the conflict between safety and convenience, we developed three
exchange mechanisms that can guarantee against defection from a contract. Two of them reduce
the entry fee by integrating multiple deals and controlling the flow of goods and money. The other
reduces the entry fee by incorporating a third-party agent into the exchange process. We examine
the lower bound of the entry fee for both of these mechanisms and describe a calculation method by
which this value can be obtained in linear time. Our results show that the described mechanism can
effectively reduce the lower bound of the entry fee.  2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.
T. Sandholm and Y. Zhou, Surplus equivalence of leveled commitment contracts
In automated negotiation systems consisting of self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally
been binding. Leveled commitment contracts—i.e., contracts where each party can decommit by
paying a predetermined penalty—were recently shown to improve expected social welfare even if
agents decommit strategically in Nash equilibrium. Such contracts differ based on whether agents
have to declare their decommitting decisions sequentially or simultaneously, and whether or not
agents have to pay the penalties if both decommit. For a given contract, these mechanisms lead to
different decommitting thresholds, probabilities, and expected social welfare. However, this paper
shows that each of these mechanisms leads to the same social welfare when the contract price and
penalties are optimized for each mechanism separately. Our derivations allow agents to construct
optimal leveled commitment contracts. We show that such integrative bargaining does not hinder
distributive bargaining: the surplus can be divided arbitrarily (as long as each agent benefits), e.g.,
equally, without compromising optimality. Nonuniqueness questions are answered. We also show
that surplus equivalence ceases to hold if agents are not risk neutral.  2002 Published by Elsevier
Science B.V.
